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The Ethics of Unwinnable War
Dominic Tierney

INTRODUCTION
By 2004, the Iraq War had become unwinnable. Iraq had descended into
sustained civil conflict, involving rival sectarian militias. A1 Qaeda in Iraq
targeted US and Iraqi security forces, Shiites, and the United Nations. In April
2004, the Abu Ghraib scandal revealed systematic American mistreatment
of prisoners, eroding the legitimacy of the campaign. Given the worsening
security conditions, there was no plausible path for Washington to create a
stable Iraq at a sufficiently low cost to count as victory. The United States
began a tortuous journey to extricate itself from a quagmire, involving the
initial ‘leave-to-win’ policy that only worsened Iraq’s strife, the surge of US
troops in 2007 that helped to create fragile stability, the exit of US soldiers in
2011, and the invasion of Iraq by ISIS in 2014, which triggered the reinsertion
of thousands of American ground personnel.
For the United States, the Iraq War was a traumatic experience, but unfor
tunately, not an unusual one. The campaign is part of a string of unwinnable
wars since World War II, including Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan. When a
military campaign deteriorates, officials face both profound strategic dilemmas
and stark moral challenges. How can Washington resolve a failed war in an
ethical manner? For example, the fall of South Vietnam to communism in 1975
produced a wave of repression and a mass evacuation of‘boat people’ from the
country. But to continue the war in Vietnam in an effort to save civilians would
have risked further death and injury in a futile venture. Today, should the
rights of Afghan women be sacrificed in a bid to reach a deal with the Taliban
and end the fighting?
One of the most useful frameworks for answering these questions is just war
theory, which establishes constraints and regulations on the initiation, pros
ecution, and termination of war. Scholars in the just war tradition, however,
usually consider scenarios where victory is still a plausible outcome and
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neglect the issue of unwinnable war.^ This chapter considers how just war
theory can be adapted when a campaign turns into a quagmire. Building on
arguments in my book The Right Way to Lose a War (Tierney 2015), we focus
on the US experience of conflict since 1945. We find that the justness of war is
not static but can evolve over time. An unjust war for regime change may gain
a new—and just—cause to protect civilians against a terrorist enemy. To
maximize justice when a campaign is in retreat, leaders should typically pursue
a middle path between ‘cut and run’ and ‘stay the course’, by limiting the war
aims, resisting pressure to resort to barbarism, embracing negotiations with
the adversary, and seeking the best possible peace from the range of plausible
alternatives.

JUST WAR THEORY
War refers to an armed contest between political communities to decide who
gets to govern and how. Just war theory (JWT) is a tradition of military ethics
designed to mitigate the brutality of war, which stretches back to the Sanskrit
epic The Mahabharata. JWT is central to Catholic teaching on the morality of
war, is widely taught in US and other military schools, has profoundly shaped
international law (including the UN Charter, the Hague Conventions, and the
Geneva Conventions), and is often invoked to defend wars. For example, the
Southern Baptist Convention (2003) claimed that ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom
was a warranted action based upon historic principles of just war’ (see also
Orend 2013; Farrell 2013; Crawford 2003: 6).
JWT is usually divided into an ethical triptych.^ Jus ad helium establishes
principles for when to fight wars.^ First, there must be a just cause to protect
people’s rights: for example, defending against aggression or safeguarding
innocent life, as opposed to using force for narrow self-aggrandizement.
Second, a competent authority should initiate the war, defined as a political
system that allows for just behaviour, which would exclude a brutal dictator
ship. Third, there should be a high probability of success to avoid expending
lives in a futile endeavour (for further discussion, see ‘The Probability of
Success in Just War Theory’ in Chapter 9). Fourth, war should be a last resort
when other avenues such as diplomacy have been exhausted. Fifth, the overall
benefits of the war must be proportionate to the evil imposed, which is known
' For a very different take on the continuing relevance of the notion of victory in contem
porary armed conflict, see Chapter 7 in this volume.
^ It should be noted, however, that Daniel Brunstetter (Chapter 13 in this volume) argues for
an additional category of analysis, jus ad vim.
^ For a further discussion of how victory relates to jus ad bellum, see Patterson’s ‘War Aims,
jus ad helium, and Victory’ in Chapter 7.

The Ethics of Unwinnable War

125

as macro-proportionality (Walzer 2015: ch. 4; Farrell 2013: 15-18; Murphy
2014; Statman 2008).
Jus in hello establishes principles for rightful conduct in war once hostilities
have begun. First, non-combatants are immune and prisoners of war must be
treated humanely. Second, when selecting targets, the anticipated collateral
damage in civilian lives should be proportionate to the military benefit, and
due care must be taken to limit the risks of non-combatant suffering. Third,
cruel and unusual weapons of war such as mass rape are inherently unjust
(Farrell 2013: 18-19).
Jus post helium refers to creating a just post-war world, including the
settlement of post-conflict issues, the ethical treatment of the defeated side,
and the minimization of suffering for civilians. First, the victorious side should
promptly end the war when the threatened rights have been vindicated, or the
aggressor is prepared to negotiate terms of surrender with appropriate com
pensation. Second, punishment must be employed in a discriminate fashion
against guilty leaders rather than the mass population. Third, peace terms
should be proportionate to the rights violated rather than being Carthaginian
in scope. In other words, the aggressor state should be demilitarized and
potentially rehabilitated, rather than destroyed. The fundamental goal is not
to restore the pre-war status quo: a state of affairs which, after all, triggered the
original conflict. Instead, the aim is a better peace than before (see ‘Victory
and Just Peace in the Just War Tradition’ in Chapter 12), which enhances the
security of rights, empowers local people, spreads democracy, and reduces the
odds of future violence (Farrell 2013: 19; Orend 2013; Walzer 2004a: 166;
Rigby 2005; Patterson 2012).
JWT does not offer a precise checklist. After all, how would we know if
war was truly a last resort and every alternative option had been tried? And
what probability of success is required: some possibility (say, 10 per cent) or
better than even odds (say, 60 per cent)? Rather, JWT can be considered as a
set of overarching principles that forces actors to make the case for an ethical
campaign.

UNWINNABLE WAR
As noted in the previous section, one of the key principle of jus ad helium is
that victory is possible. However, for the United States, clear-cut success has
become a rarity in contemporary conflict, whereas quagmires have become all
too frequent. How does JWT apply to an unwinnable war, or a military
campaign where decisive victory is no longer a plausible outcome? Victory
means achieving the state’s goals with a favourable cost/benefit analysis. If the
enemy’s resistance proves stronger than anticipated, allies jump ship, or
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domestic divisions occur, it may no longer be possible to attain the core
objectives at a sufficiently low cost to count as a clear success.
Discussions of war sometimes fall into the trap of depicting the outcome of
conflict in binary terms as a victory or defeat, like a sports match.^ But the
outcome of war lies on a spectrum, and there is a wide range of possible
results, including decisive success, partial success, a draw, partial failure, or
decisive failure. As a result, there are many different kinds of unwinnable wars.
In an extreme scenario, the only possible outcome is total defeat, for example,
with the German war effort in 1945. But in other unwinnable wars there may
be a wider range of potential results.
Here we focus on one particular kind of unwinnable war, a campaign of
limited interests that turns into a quagmire, which I term a fiasco. Fiascos are
not wars of national survival like World War II. Instead, they are expedition
ary missions involving restricted national interests. If unexpected battlefield
loss occurs, achieving the main goals of the campaign may cost too much
blood and treasure and reap too small a benefit. Since the war only involves
limited stakes, leaders cannot keep fighting indefinitely. Although victory is
not achievable, many different outcomes may still be possible, from a partial
success through to a debacle. In other words, there is potentially a great deal
still to play for, both strategically and morally. The difference between a draw
and a debacle may equate to the lives of thousands of soldiers and civilians (for
more on the fiasco concept, see Tierney 2015).
Since 1945, Washington has fought five major wars (defined as campaigns
where the United States deployed over 50,000 troops and there were at least
1000 battle deaths on all sides): Korea, Vietnam, the Gulf War, Iraq, and
Afghanistan. Four of those wars—Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan—
became fiascos. Only in the Gulf War did victory remain on the table. After
World War II, the nature of war evolved from inter-state war to civil war and
the US military struggled to adapt to the new environment of counter
insurgency (Tierney 2015: ch. 1).
In June 1950, communist North Korea invaded non-communist South
Korea, and the United States organized an international coalition to aid
Seoul under the command of General Douglas MacArthur. US-led forces
pushed the North Koreans out of the South, crossed the 38th parallel into
North Korea, and advanced towards the Chinese border. In October 1950,
China intervened, triggering a major US battlefield defeat and forcing American
and allied troops south of the 38th parallel. By the end of 1950, the war was
unwinnable. Decisive success, or the overthrow of the North Korean regime at a
reasonable cost, was an implausible outcome. As MacArthur put it, we face an
entirely new war’ (Stueck 2002: 93).
■* The biblical presentation of victory is indicative of this approach; see ‘New Directions’ in
Chapter 2, this volume.
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A decade later, the United States suffered another fiasco in Vietnam. By
1966, decisive victory, or the creation of a secure and independent South
Vietnam, could not be achieved at a reasonable cost. The United States was
unable to suppress the South Vietnamese insurgents (known as the Viet Cong
or the National Liberation Front), or force North Vietnamese troops to leave
the South. The Communists displayed extraordinary commitment, whereas
America’s ally. South Vietnam, lacked legitimacy or a popular base of support
(Boot 2013: 420; Berman 1989: 13-22).
More recently, the US War on Terror triggered two fiascos. In 2001, the
United States overthrew the Taliban regime in Afghanistan at remarkably low
cost. But Washington demonstrated only a modest commitment to build a
new Afghan state, and the Taliban recovered in southern Afghanistan as well
as in sanctuaries in Pakistan. By 2006, the war in Afghanistan was unwinnable.
There was no credible path to defeat the insurgents at a reasonable cost. By this
point, the Taliban controlled significant territory in the south, and from 2005
to 2006, Taliban armed attacks tripled from 1500 to 4500 (Jones 2010; Tomsen
2011; Malkasian 2013). Meanwhile, the United States endured a further fiasco
in Iraq. By 2004, the Iraq War was unwinnable as the prospect of stabilizing
the country receded into the distance. The insurgency had metastasized with
multiple Sunni and Shiite rebel groups. In 2003, there were 486 US military
fatalities. In 2004, this figme almost doubled to 849.^
How can leaders fight an unwinnable war in a just manner? JWT has tended
to neglect this question. Scholars often assmne that decisive victory remains a
viable option on the table. In other words, leaders are told to select a war they
can win, achieve victory without resorting to barbarism, and then impose a
just settlement on the defeated party. As Walzer (2015:110) says, ‘A just war is
one that is morally urgent to win.’ The inattention to unwinnable war is
surprising given America’s recent history of quagmires, as well as the crucial
role of the Vietnam War in triggering renewed interest in JWT (Walzer 2015:
335). This neglect may result from JWT’s lack of focus on jus post helium
(which is particularly relevant in unwinnable wars) compared to jus ad helium
and jus in hello, as well as the wider absence of scholarship in international
relations on issues of unwinnable war and conflict termination (Walzer 2015;
Orend 2001; Patterson 2012; Tierney 2015).
The inattention to unwinnable war is problematic because theorists have
focused on a scenario of winnable war that—for the United States at least—has
recently been the exception rather than the rule. Furthermore, unwinnable
wars raise significant ethical issues. Fighting a just war is problematic even
when a military campaign is proceeding smoothly. But now the nation is
reeling from battlefield loss and the war effort is unravelling. By definition, an

^ See <http://icasualties.org>; <http://www.brookings.edu/about/centers/saban/iraq-index>.
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unwinnable campaign has already violated a key tenet of just war theory: a
reasonable chance of success. Furthermore, although the original goals may
once have represented a just cause, these aims cannot be fully achieved at an
acceptable cost. The United States may be at fault for the deteriorating
campaign, for example, due to overconfidence and poor planning, and there
fore could accrue a particular moral responsibility to limit the damage to
civilians. At the same time, the worsening campaign means that the United
States has a reduced capacity to shape outcomes. In other words, Washington
has more responsibility and less influence.
How can officials end a failing war in a just manner? Which values must be
sacrificed in a bid to end the war? Does Washington have an obligation to fix
what it destroyed and save its friends? Or should officials be willing to
abandon their allies in a bid to end a deteriorating venture?

THE JUST WAY TO LOSE
If victory is an unrealistic goal, leaders must choose a viable exit strategy to
cut the nation’s losses, safeguard its interests, and protect the rights of
soldiers and civilians. A fiasco is not an excuse to abandon the pursuit of
justice. The danger is not the kind of existential threat that might necessitate
survival at any price. And a range of outcomes may still be attainable, with
significant variation in the degree of justice. At the same time, the exit
strategy will almost certainly involve some compromise or outright sacrifice
of moral principle. Rory Stewart and Gerald Knaus (2011) draw a useful
analogy between ethical goals in war and mountain rescue operations. There
is a moral purpose to save a stranded climber. But this obligation must be
balanced by responsibilities to the rescue party. What if the rescue mission
risks further loss? An unwinnable war is like a mountain rescue mission in
the midst of a mighty tempest. The rescuers need a cool-headed analysis of
what can reasonably be achieved.
After a war becomes unwinnable, several JWT principles may be moot.
For example, by this point in time, the question of whether or not the
initiation of hostilities was a first resort or a last resort is settled. But most
JWT principles remain in play, including jus ad bellum notions of fighting
for a just cause, choosing achievable goals, and ensuring that the overall
benefits of the war outweigh the costs; jus in bellum notions of protecting the
immunity of civilians and prisoners; and jus post bellum notions of creating
an ethical settlement. The solution is to follow a multistep process: redefin
ing war aims, negotiating an acceptable peace, and avoiding the embrace of
barbarism.
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REDEFINE WAR AIMS
The key to extricating a country from an unwinnable conflict in a just manner
is to redefine the goals of the war. Here, goals refer to political aims, or who
rules a given territory and in what ways. According to Carl von Clausewitz
(1989: 87), war is not about destruction as an end in itself, but is instead, a
‘political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with
other means’ (see Chapter 3 for a discussion of Clausewitz). A fiasco implies
that the original objectives are unattainable at an acceptable price in blood and
treasure and must be rethought. There will be no triumphant peace. There will
be no surrender ceremony. There will be no war termination based on
occupying and rehabilitating a prostrate adversary.
The JWT principle that victory must be achievable might imply that an
unwinnable war is inherently unjust and should be concluded immediately.
But in a fiasco, cutting and running is rarely an ethical choice. There is a
difference between a potential conflict and a war that has already begun. In
peacetime, there is a moral presumption against initiating war, and the
belligerent has the burden of demonstrating that just war conditions have
been satisfied. But there is no moral presumption to quit an ongoing cam
paign. Precipitously ending a military operation may produce severe strategic
and ethical costs, including the collapse of the war effort and a humanitarian
crisis. Having caused (at least in part) negative consequences for other people,
leaders incur a responsibility to mitigate the damage. Indeed, even if the war
has thus far caused harm to civilians beyond what would have been considered
proportionate at the start, it should not necessarily be terminated. Excessive past
civilian deaths are to a large extent a sunk cost: the key is to assess probable
future harm (McMahan 2015).
Most recent US fiascos involve nation building and counter-insurgency
in the midst of a civil war. Walzer (2015: ch. 6) is sceptical about the justice
of intervention in a foreign internal conflict except to help a political
community achieve liberation, balance intervention by another state, or
prevent gross violations of human rights. Although it may often be unjust
to wade into a civil war, it does not follow that once a country is engaged
in a nation-building mission, and the operation begins to unravel, it should
be abandoned. Even if the project of reshaping political and social institu
tions was originally unjust, aborting it in mid-stream could produce the
worst of all worlds: societal collapse. Instead, there is a responsibility to
pursue what Walzer (2004a: 166) calls a ‘just occupation’ involving selfsacrifice rather than profiteering, and an effort to protect individual rights.
According to the so-called ‘Pottery Barn’ rule, ‘you break it, you own it’
(Walzer 2002: 940; see Chapter 10 in this volume for a discussion of victory
in hybrid warfare).
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Although leaders should not abandon the campaign, they ought to select a
narrower set of goals. A fiasco implies that the country lacks the military
capability to achieve its original aims. Reducing the ambition of the objectives
is strategically necessary to align the ends and means of war. Dialling down the
war aims is also consistent with JWT. Since the futile pursuit of a cause is
unjust, the war aims must be consistent with strategic possibility. In addition,
the principle of macro-proportionality states that the overall benefits of the
war must outweigh the evil imposed. Battlefield reversals suggest that this cost/
benefit analysis has altered. Only by selecting a revised set of goals can the
costs and benefits be appropriately balanced.®
Walzer (2015) argued that just war involves limited goals since internation
al order rests on norms of accommodation and restraint. Maximal goals of
conquest and the political reconstruction of the adversary can be justified only
in extreme scenarios like World War II. The case for limited goals is strength
ened when a state endures battlefield loss and victory becomes implausible. If
just wars are conservative, unwinnable just wars are very conservative.
How should the war aims be re-evaluated? Leaders must carefully assess
the strategic stakes, including the probable costs and benefits of pursuing
each objective, the potential for allied support and public backing, possible
negative contingencies, and the likely sustainability of gains over the longer
term. What about the ethical dimension? When victory is still attainable, the
goal of a just war is a better peace than the status quo ante helium, or a greater
protection of rights than before, and the removal of factors that originally
caused the war. In an unwinnable war, however, a better peace than before
may not be realistic. Instead, the aim is the best peace possible from the range
of plausible alternatives.
The ambition of the war aims will depend in part on the underlying justice
of the mission. If the campaign began in accordance with just war principles—
as a last resort, in self-defence, for a compelling moral purpose—then rela
tively more expansive goals can be justified even if a decisive victory is
implausible. As the fundamentals of the war deviate from just war principles,
appropriate war aims will tend to be more modest.
It is notable that the justice of the war aims may evolve during a military
operation. For example, a state may initiate a regime change mission without
satisfying the just war conditions for jus ad helium. If the enemy regime is
toppled and the target country then destabilizes, however, the task of provid
ing security and representative government to the population may be con
sidered just. The overall war is not retrospectively rehabilitated. But the
original murky ethics of the invasion do not invalidate the new moral purpose;
indeed, they may imply additional responsibility for cleaning up the mess
® This argument, which overlaps with that of Brunstetter (Chapter 13), runs contrary to that
made by Patterson (‘The Scandal of Winning’ in Chapter 7), both in this volume.
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(Walzer 2004b). Furthermore, there must also be a kind of moral triage. Given
battlefield reversals, leaders will need to prioritize certain ethical goals over
others: for example, the prevention of mass killing or genocide. Leaders must
also ensure that moral gains are sustainable: saving lives in the immediate term
should not risk chaos in the longer term.
Here, we can briefly consider the justice of US war aims in Korea, Vietnam,
and Iraq. These cases reveal that an exit strategy can be unjust for a variety of
reasons, including because the belligerent tries to leave too slowly or too
quickly. When the Korean War became unwinnable in late 1950, following
Chinese intervention, Truman chose to reduce the war aims, which was both
strategically and morally justifiable. MacArthur urged Washington to widen
the objectives and take the war to China, which could have risked the outbreak
of World War III. Instead, the United States and its key allies abandoned the
goal of regime change in North Korea, and embraced the more modest
objective of negotiating a return to essentially the pre-war status quo. This
aim safeguarded the core moral basis for the war effort: defending South Korea
fi'om aggression. The reassessment of war aims was critical in ending the
campaign without costly escalation or disastrous retreat (Stueck 1995: 136-7).
By contrast, Washington failed to adjust its objectives in Vietnam, further
eroding the justice of the war effort. Even as the costs of war grew dramatically
after 1965, Johnson maintained the maximal goal of an independent and non
communist South Vietnam (Vandiver 1997). This expansive aim was an
exercise in futility, failed the test of macro-proportionality by incurring dev
astating costs with uncertain benefits, and, arguably, did not align with the
wishes of the Vietnamese people.
Were Richard Nixon’s war aims just? From 1969-73, Nixon steadily with
drew US troops and pursued negotiations with Hanoi to attain ‘peace with
honor’ (Tierney 2015: ch. 2). In January 1973, the White House announced a
deal to end US involvement in the war, which allowed the South Vietnamese
regime of Nguyen Van Thieu to remain in office. But Nixon’s policy also failed
the test of macro-proportionality. To pressure Hanoi, Nixon expanded the war
by invading Laos and Cambodia, dramatically stepped up the bombing of
North Vietnam, and mined the North Vietnamese port of Haiphong. In the
end, an additional 20,000 Americans were killed during the Nbcon presidency,
together with around 500,000 North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops, and
hundreds of thousands of civilians. ‘Peace with honor’ was an illusion because
Hanoi’s military victory was almost inevitable. If Saigon could not repress the
insurgency or defeat North Vietnamese forces with the aid of 500,000 American
troops, how could it expect to do so after US soldiers left? National Security
Advisor Henry Kissinger sought a ‘decent interval’ between US troops leaving
and the final collapse in the South (Hughes 2010: 501; Rose 2010: 191-3;
Kimball 2001). A decent interval to mask defeat is an insufficient moral basis
to continue a highly destructive war. Indeed, the terms that Washington
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gained in 1973 could have been achieved in 1968 or even 1965 (Kaiser 2000:
427; Logevall 2001: 2).
In Iraq, the US war aims were also unjust, but for a different reason:
too little commitment. Walzer wrote (2004a: 164): ‘having fought the war,
we are now responsible for the well-being of the Iraqi people.’ But after Iraq
became a fiasco in 2004, Washington pursued a policy of ‘leave-to-win’
based on withdrawing as soon as possible. The Bush administration was
fiercely opposed to the idea of prolonged nation building in Iraq. Instead,
the White House sought to hand over sovereignty to Iraqi exiles and other
supporters, hastily train Iraqi security forces, let Baghdad take the lead in
providing security, and reduce US troop levels from 130,000 to 100,000 by
the end of 2006 (Dodge 2012: 246-50; Ricks 2009: 52). The predictable result
was further chaos. For example, Baghdad could not provide security because
government forces often doubled as death squads. In 2005-6, Iraqi civilian
deaths increased from 20,000 to 35,000/
In summary, Truman’s revised goals in Korea were just, whereas the
objectives in Vietnam and Iraq were unjust. In part, this reflected the fact
that Korea was the only war among these three campaigns that was originally
fought for a just cause—the defence of South Korea from external aggression—
which provided a moral anchor for the mission. Vietnam did not have a just
cause because of the implausibility of success and the questionable correlation
of US goals with the popular will of the local people. Meanwhile, the invasion
of Iraq was also unjust because the campaign was far from a last resort,
represented a preventive war against a distant threat, and faced uncertain
odds of success.
What distinguished Vietnam and Iraq? First of all, the cause in Vietnam was
never just because of widespread popular support for the insurgents. In Iraq,
however, there was greater local backing for a representative regime, and
therefore, the goal of providing stability to the country can be considered
just. The second difference is the battlefield reality. The strength of North
Vietnam and the Viet Cong, and the weakness of Saigon, meant that the
United States should have moved more quickly to negotiate a deal based on a
unified and neutralized Vietnam. In Iraq, however, the insurgency lacked the
capabilities or the legitimacy of the Viet Cong. Even if decisive victory was not
attainable in Iraq, the goal of improving security through a greater commit
ment of capabilities was realistic. The invasion of Iraq may have been unjust
but the solution of ‘leave-to-win’ simply compounded the moral error.
Having established revised goals, the United States will typically need to
surge its forces, or send temporary reinforcements as part of an ultimate exit
strategy. Given the deteriorating strategic conditions, a surge may be necessary

See <http://www.brookings.edu/about/centers/saban/iraq-index>.
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to avoid a sudden collapse of the war effort. Furthermore, battlefield failure
implies a mismatch between the objectives of the campaign and US capabil
ities in the field. Dialling down the aims and strengthening capabilities can
bring the ends and means into alignment. In 2007, for example, the United
States ordered a surge of forces in Iraq, which contributed to a stark fall in
violence (Ucko 2009: ch. 6). And there is also an ethical case for a surge.
Murphy (2014: 152) wrote that there is a moral obligation ‘to take advantage
of everything that would make victory more likely. It would not be morally
acceptable to content oneself with a 75 percent chance of winning if one knew
that certain strategies would raise that to a 95 percent chance and those
strategies were to hand.’

THE PROBLEM OF NEGOTIATING
An unwinnable war will likely require a shift to a negotiated compromise
peace. Indeed, every US fiasco since 1945—Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and
Afghanistan—involved extensive bargaining with the enemy. American cul
ture is often sceptical about negotiating with evil adversaries, in part due to
the moralism of US society. George W. Bush (2005) claimed that America’s
enemies ‘will not be stopped by negotiation, or concessions, or appeals to
reason. In this war, there is only one option—and that is victory.’ Wartime
negotiations are inherently ethically challenging. There may be profound
differences in moral values, for example, between US ideals of individual
freedom and North Vietnamese communism or the Taliban’s vision of an
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The enemy may have committed serious
human rights violations or abrogated the most basic diplomatic norms. In
2011, for example, the Taliban sent an envoy to meet the chair of the Afghan
High Peace Council. The envoy embraced the chair, and thereupon detonated
a bomb hidden in his turban, killing them both (Bew et al. 2013). In certain
cases, where the adversary is truly extreme and intransigent, such as ISIS, there
may be little potential for peace talks.
But once a war becomes unwinnable, justice typically requires a negotiated
end to the fighting. How else will the United States achieve long-term peace
and the protection of national interests and human rights? There is a danger of
snubbing negotiations on ethical grounds and then ultimately incurring even
greater moral injury. In 2003, Paul Wolfowitz, the Deputy Secretary of
Defense, received a memo proposing that the United States reach out to
Sunni insurgents. Wolfowitz rejected the idea and scribbled three words in
the margin: ‘They are Nazis!’ (Perry 2010: 10). As a result, Iraq spiralled
downward into disorder and sectarian warfare.
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Diplomacy has proved effective in unwinnable wars. In 2006-7, the US
negotiated an alliance with Sunni tribal leaders in Iraq, and signed up tens of
thousands of Sunnis for the Awakening Councils and the ‘Sons of Iraq’
programme, which helped pull Iraq back from the brink (Biddle et al. 2012).
The American diplomat Richard Holbrooke did not regret bargaining with
immoral people. ‘If you can prevent the deaths of people still alive, you’re not
doing a disservice to those already killed by trying to do so’ (Lee 2010).
What about war crimes trials? Many just war theorists see trials or tribunals
as morally indispensable. For example, Walzer wrote (2015:287; see also Orend,
2013; 193-5) that people can ‘rightly demand an accounting’ from leaders, who
may be ‘criminally responsible’ for aggression. But in an unwinnable war, there
is less scope for war crimes trials. Battlefield loss means the adversary cannot be
forced to appear before a tribunal. In Afghanistan today, for example, insisting
on war crimes trials could make a peace deal with the Taliban impossible
(Snyder and Vinjamuri 2003/4). However, there remains scope for targeting
abuses on one’s own side: for example, Washington pimished the American
guards at Abu Ghraib with prison terms and hard labour.

THE PROBLEM OF BARBARISM
The principles of jus in bello are designed to restrain the barbarism of war,
notably by drawing a distinction between combatants and innocent civilians.
A central debate in JWT concerns the tension between the standards of jus
in bello and the military requirements to achieve victory (Walzer 2015: 48). In
the case of unwinnable war, there is a tension between the standards ofjus in
bello and the military requirements to achieve a lesser loss versus a greater loss.
When exiting from a quagmire, can leaders embrace barbarism? If enemy
resistance proves greater than expected, there is often pressure to remove
restraints. For example, when a war is unwinnable, states may also seek to
signal credibility and strength through destructive acts. In December 1972,
Nixon launched the ‘Christmas bombing’ of Hanoi and Haiphong, causing
widespread destruction of North Vietnamese infrastructure and, according to
Hanoi, the deaths of 1600 civilians. The practical benefit of the bombing was
minimal. In January 1973, the two sides signed an agreement that had been on
the table since October. Instead, the bombing was mainly about optics:
creating the impression of bombing the North into submission and demon
strating US credibility even as it withdrew. The Christmas bombing is in
defensible by just war standards because it extracted a grave price in civilian
deaths for a dubious symbolic benefit.
Walzer (2015; 267) argued that restraints on war can be overridden in a
‘supreme emergency’ where there is an imminent risk of great evil such as
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enslavement, and no obvious military alternatives—for example, with the
British bombing of German cities in 1940. ‘Utilitarian calculation can force
us to violate the rules of war only when we are face-to-face not merely with
defeat but with a defeat likely to bring disaster to a political community.’ But
fiascos rarely if ever represent a supreme emergency. When a US campaign in
a country like Vietnam or Afghanistan unravels, the heavens are not about to
fall on the American political community. Therefore, the core principle of
proportionality should be protected.
Most recent American fiascos have been counter-insurgency operations,
which provide particular challenges in terms oijus in hello. For example, the
insurgent enemy may hide among the people, complicating the distinction
between combatant and non-combatant. Adversaries may deliberately seek
to kill civilians in terrorist attacks. But even in asymmetric war, troops are
expected to avoid targeting civilians. Indeed, there are powerful strategic
reasons to reject barbarism in counter-insurgency campaigns. One of the
basic principles of counter-insurgency or COIN is to outgovern the guer
rillas and win ‘hearts and minds’ through the use of minimal force and the
protection of the rule of law (US Army and Marine Corps 2007; Walzer
2015: xiv).
One danger in an unwinnable war is that the attachment to a single moral
principle can dominate a wider and more complex ethical calculus, blinding
officials to the practical consequences of their actions. For example, a key
notion of jus in hello is that prisoners of war acquire rights and should be
considered immune from harm. Orend (2013: 192) wrote: ‘Obviously, a just
peace settlement further requires that any and all prisoners-of-war... be
returned safely to their home countries.’ In the Korean War, however, the
protection of prisoner’s rights had perverse consequences.
By early 1952, after six months of truce negotiations, the peace terms had
mostly been resolved, including the borders between North and South Korea.
The only major issue left was the status of the POWs. China and North Korea
demanded the traditional ‘all for all’ swap of POWs, which was consistent
with the Geneva Conventions. But President Truman decided that captured
communist prisoners should be allowed to defect. The motivations for this
decision were complex. US officials were aware of the propaganda benefit
if thousands of enemy prisoners chose to stay in the ‘free world’. But the
main intention was humanitarian. Some of the prisoners were South Koreans
who had been forcibly impressed into the communist military, and wanted
to return to their homes in the South. There was also lingering guilt in
Washington about the compulsory return of liberated Soviet POWs to Stalin
in 1945, many of whom died in the gulags. In his diary, Truman suggested
a strategy for US negotiators. ‘Read Confucius on morals to them. Read
Buddha’s code to them. Read the Declaration of Independence to them.
Read the French declaration. Liberty & Fraternity. Read the Bill of Rights to
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them. Read the 5th, 6th, & 7th Chapters of St. Matthew to them’ (Rose 2010:
143; Stanley 2009; Foot 1990).
Was the insistence on voluntary repatriation a just poHcy? Walzer (2015:
123) claimed that US negotiators were ‘probably right’ to uphold this principle
in Korea—an example of appropriate ‘moral reasons for prolonging a war’.
And in Walzer’s defence, 22,600 communist prisoners were able to defect. But
Truman’s commitment to POW rights produced extraordinary costs. One
problem lay in determining how many communist POWs actually wanted to
defect. In the prison camps, anti-communist prisoners often ran the repatri
ation screenings and violently coerced POWs into defecting (Rose 2010:
147-8). As the number of supposed defectors swelled into the tens of thou
sands, the communist countries saw the issue in terms of national prestige and
refused to back down. In turn, Truman framed the policy as one of high moral
principle. ‘To agree to forced repatriation would be unthinkable’, he told the
American people; ‘We will not buy an armistice by turning over human beings
for slaughter or slavery’ (Stanley 2009: 158).
The issue of POW rights prolonged the war for fifteen months, during
which time 100,000 allied troops were killed (including 9000 Americans), 3600
American prisoners endured continued captivity, every major North Korean
city was carpet-bombed, and hundreds of thousands of civilians died (Stueck
2002: ch. 6). Finally, in the spring of 1953, after Stalin’s death, the communists
conceded the principle of voluntary repatriation, and a neutral commission
was created to process the prisoners.
The communists (and Stalin in particular) bore the greater share of moral
responsibility both for the initiation of the war and its prolongation. Never
theless, without thinking through the consequences, Truman fixated on a
single principle of POW rights, with ultimate grave injury to soldiers and
civilians. Less moralistic rhetoric and more prudent analysis of likely conse
quences might have delivered a compromise that saved hundreds of thousands
of lives.
The pursuit of justice does not end with a negotiated peace. Washington has
a continued responsibility to diminish suffering. This means providing aid to
refugees escaping from the warzone, and assistance for allies on the ground,
like translators, who may risk death for helping the Americans. Adequate
physical and mental health resources must be offered to veterans, who may
have potentially served in a protracted counter-insurgency war with extended
deployments and now lack the solace of victory. At the broader level, justice
also requires a reckoning of the lessons of the military campaign. How can
future debacles be averted? Americans must confront the tough lessons of war
and take responsibility for failures, including war crimes. Fiascos are also an
opportunity to adapt and reform. People and countries learn by failing, and
the experience of loss can help cut through barriers to change. Over time,
reconciliation with the adversary may also promote justice. Charles Kupchan
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(2010) described how reconciliation often begins with a peace offering, fol
lowed by growing political, economic, and cultural contacts, and the creation
of new and more positive narratives of the relationship. Indeed, many US allies
were once adversaries, including Britain, Mexico, Spain, Italy, Germany,
Japan, and possibly, in due course, Vietnam.

CONCLUSION
Extricating a country from a quagmire in a just manner may be the greatest
challenge in politics. The stakes are high: a lesser loss versus a greater loss can
represent life or death for thousands or millions. First of all, leaders should
recognize that the outcome of war is not a binary, or victory versus defeat.
Instead, officials facing an unwinnable conflict must traverse a grey zone
between triumph and disaster, seeking a lesser loss versus a greater loss, or the
best peace possible. This will often be ugly stability, or an imperfect order that
protects core interests and values. Leaders should also note that the justice of a
military campaign may be more fluid than is often thought. Wars that start with
an unjust cause of regime change may later acquire a just cause to protect
civilian rights from extremist groups. In response, leaders should typically
reduce the ambition of the goals (without cutting and running), surge capabil
ities, negotiate with the adversary, limit the role of war crimes trials, maintain
restraints on barbarism, and avoid fixating on a single ethical principle.
Does the argument only apply to the United States? The extent of American
interventionism during and after the Cold War means that the United States is
particularly likely to end up in a fiasco, or an expeditionary campaign that
becomes unwinnable. Certain challenges to a just exit strategy are also espe
cially acute in Washington. For example, negotiating with immoral enemies in
wartime tends to be more controversial in the United States than in other
countries. But the basic framework also applies to other states. The French in
Algeria and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan faced many of the same moral
and strategic dilemmas as they sought to wind down failing wars.
Quagmires may also present an opportunity to rethink and develop JWT.
It is notable that tough wars like Vietnam often trigger renewed scholarship
in JWT (Orend 2013: 24). Difficult campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan may
therefore produce fresh analysis of the ethics of fighting in an age of counter
insurgency, terrorism, and drone strikes. The former CIA director John
Brennan said that Barack Obama and himself shared similar views of just
war theory. ‘The president requires near-certainty of no collateral damage. But
if he believes it is necessary to act, he doesn’t hesitate’ (Goldberg 2016). By
considering the justice of an unwinnable war, scholars can focus on a scenario,
that, for the United States at least, appears to be the new normal.

138

Dominic Tierney

REFERENCES
Berman, Larry. 1989. Lyndon Johnson’s War: The Road to Stalemate in Vietnam.
New York: W. W. Norton & Co.
Bew, John, Ryan Evans, Martyn Frampton, Peter Neumann, and Marisa Forges.
2013. ‘Talking to the Taliban: Hope over History?’, International Centre for the
Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence. Available online at <http://icsr.
info/2013/06/icsr-insight-talking-to-the-taliban-hope-over-history/>, accessed
25 November 2016.
Biddle, Stephen, Jeffrey A. Friedman, and Jacob N. Shapiro. 2012. ‘Testing the Surge:
Why Did Violence Decline in Iraq in 2007?’, International Security yi\ 7-40.
Boot, Max. 2013. Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient
Times to the Present. New York: Liveright.
Bush, George W. 2005. ‘Commencement Address at the United States Naval Academy
in Annapolis, Maryland’, 27 May. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.
edu/ws/index.php?pid=63919>, accessed 25 November 2016.
Clausewitz, Carl von. 1989. On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Crawford, Neta C. 2003. ‘Just War Theory and the U.S. Cotmterterror War’, Perspec
tives on Politics 1: 5-25.
Dodge, Toby. 2012. ‘Iraq’, in Richard Caplan (ed.), Exit Strategies and State Building.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Farrell, Michael. 2013. Modern Just War Theory: A Guide to Research. Lanham,
MD: Scarecrow Press.
Foot, Rosemary. 1990. A Substitute for Victory: The Politics of Peacemaking at the
Korean Armistice Talks. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Goldberg, Jeffrey. 2016. ‘The Obama Doctrine’, The Atlantic, April. Available online
at <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/
471525/>, accessed 25 November 2016.
Hughes, Ken. 2010. ‘Fatal Politics: Nixon’s Political Timetable for Withdrawing from
Vietnam’, Diplomatic History 34: 497-506.
Jones, Seth G. 2010. In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan.
New York W. W. Norton & Co.
Kaiser, David. 2000. American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the
Vietnam War. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Kimball, Jeffrey. 2001. ‘The Case of the “Decent Interval”: Do We Now Have a
Smoking Gun?’, SHAPR Newsletter 32: 35-9.
Kupchan, Charles A. 2010. How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Lee, Matthew. 2010. ‘Veteran Diplomat Holbrooke Dies at Age 69’, The Washington
Times, 13 December. Available online at <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/
2010/dec/13/us-diplomat-richard-holbrooke-dies/>, accessed 25 November 2016.
LogevaU, Fredrik. 2001. The Origins of the Vietnam War. New York: Longman.
Malkasian, Carter. 2013. War Comes to Garmser: Thirty Years of Conflict on the Afghan
Frontier. New York: Oxford University Press.
McMahan, Jeff. 2015. ‘Proportionality and Time’, Ethics 125: 1-24.
Murphy, James G. 2014. War’s Ends: Human Rights, International Order, and the
Ethics of Peace. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.

The Ethics of Unwinnable War

139

Orend, Brian. 2001. Michael Walzer on War and Justice. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s
University Press.
Orend, Brian. 2013. The Morality of War. Buffalo, NY: Broadview Press.
Patterson, Eric D. 2012. Ending Wars Well: Order, Justice, and Conciliation in Con
temporary Post-Conflict. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Perry, Mark. 2010. Talking to Terrorists: Why America Must Engage with its Enemies.
New York: Basic Books.
Ricks, Thomas E. 2009. The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American
Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008. New York: Penguin Press.
Rigby, Andrew. 2005. ‘Forgiveness and Reconciliation in jus post helium’, in Mark
Evans (ed.). Just War Theory: A Reappraisal. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press, 177-202.
Rose, Gideon. 2010. How Wars End: Why We Always Fight the Last Battle. A History of
American Intervention from World War I to Afghanistan. New York: Simon and
Schuster.
Snyder, Jack and Leslie Vinjamuri. 2003/4. ‘Trials and Errors: Principle and Prag
matism in Strategies of International Justice’, International Security 28: 5-44.
Southern Baptist Convention. 2003. ‘On the Liberation of Iraq’. Available online
at <http://www.sbc.net/resolutions/! 126/on-the-liberation-of-iraq>, accessed
25 November 2016.
Stanley, Elizabeth A. 2009. Paths to Peace: Domestic Coalition Shifts, War Termination
and the Korean War. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Statman, Daniel. 2008. ‘On the Success Condition for Legitimate Self-Defense’, Ethics
118: 659-86.
Stewart, Rory and Gerald Knaus. 2011. Can Intervention Work? New York:
W. W. Norton 8t Co.
Stueck, William. 1995. The Korean War: An International History. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Stueck, William. 2002. Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic
History. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Tierney, Dominic. 2015. The Right Way to Lose a War: America in an Age of
Unwinnable Conflicts. New York: Little, Brown and Co.
Tomsen, Peter. 2011. The Wars of Afgflanistan: Messianic Terrorism, Tribal Conflicts,
and the Failure of Great Powers. New York: PublicAffairs.
US Army and Marine Corps. 2007. The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency
Field Manual. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Ucko, David H. 2009. The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Military
for Modem Wars. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
Vandiver, Frank E. 1997. Shadows of Vietnam: Lyndon Johnson’s Wars. College
Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press.
Walzer, Michael. 2002. ‘The Triumph of Just War Theory (and the Dangers of
Success)’, Social Research 69: 925-44.
Walzer, Michael. 2004a. Arguing About War. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Walzer, Michael. 2004b. ‘Just and Unjust Occupations’, Dissent 51: 61-3.
Walzer, Michael. 2015. Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical
Illustrations, 5th edition. New York: Basic Books.

